

WESTERN HEMISPHERE READINESS SERIES

HRS RESILIENCE FOUNDATION

SECTOR READINESS ASSESSMENT 10

Western Hemisphere Strategic Infrastructure & Resilience

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CONTENTS

—	Executive Summary	3
01	Infrastructure as a System	4
02	From Sector Readiness to System Readiness	5
03	The HRS System Resilience Architecture	6
04	Critical Dependencies Across the Nine Sectors	7
05	Strategic Nodes, Corridors and Chokepoints	8
06	Energy–Digital–Industrial Nexus	9
07	Materials–Manufacturing–Logistics Nexus	10
08	Food–Medical–Infrastructure Nexus	11
09	Cascading Failure and Compound Disruption	12
10	Foreign Strategic Participation and Infrastructure Dependency	13
11	Infrastructure Optionality and Effective Redundancy	14
12	The HRS System Readiness Test	15
13	Western Hemisphere Strategic Infrastructure Landscape	16
14	Implications for the United States	17
15	50–100 Year Infrastructure Horizon	18
16	HRS Research Priorities and Decision Framework	19
17	Conclusion	20
—	Methodology, Research Integrity and Limitations	21
—	Selected Bibliography and Sources	22

About this series. The Western Hemisphere Readiness Series is an independent program of HRS Resilience Foundation research. Each assessment applies the HRS analytical constructs to a critical sector. SRA 10 extends the series to the system level by examining the dependencies and alternative pathways connecting SRA 01–09.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Case for System-Level Resilience

The first nine HRS Sector Readiness Assessments examine critical systems that support modern economic, public-service and security functions: telecommunications and digital infrastructure; data centers, cloud and artificial intelligence; critical minerals; rare earths; energy and power infrastructure; ports and logistics; food and agricultural systems; pharmaceutical and medical supply chains; and advanced manufacturing.

SRA 10 addresses the next analytical question: what happens when these systems are treated as one interconnected infrastructure architecture? A power interruption can degrade communications, data centers, water systems, manufacturing and logistics. A port disruption can constrain minerals, energy equipment, food, medicines and industrial inputs. A material shortage can become a manufacturing problem; a manufacturing problem can become an infrastructure-repair problem; and a digital disruption can reduce the ability of institutions to detect, coordinate and recover.

The HRS approach therefore shifts from sector readiness to system readiness. The relevant unit of analysis is the critical function and the set of pathways required to keep that function operating. The question is not whether every asset can be protected from every disruption. It is whether essential functions have sufficient alternatives, recovery capacity and institutional authority to remain viable when one or more dependencies fail.

The 2026 U.S. policy environment makes this system-level question particularly relevant. The National Resilience Strategy places resilience across national security, economic, public health and infrastructure reliability domains and emphasizes risk prioritization, modernization, distributed responsibility and affordability. The 2026 National Defense Strategy emphasizes the defense industrial base. Federal energy actions identify grid infrastructure, supply chains and large-scale energy infrastructure as matters relevant to national defense.^[1-5]

HRS treats these policies descriptively. The assessment does not depend on any single administration, slogan or political program. Its long-horizon architecture is built around durable institutional interests: national security, reliable infrastructure, economic strength, industrial capacity, freedom of action, secure supply chains, and the ability of sovereign states to maintain essential functions.

Across the Western Hemisphere, the objective is resilient optionality: multiple credible pathways for energy, information, materials, production, transport, food, medical supplies and emergency response. This does not require uniform policies, common ownership, or identical development models. Sovereign governments retain full authority over their resources, infrastructure, regulation, procurement and international relationships.

HRS System-Level Finding — A resilient infrastructure architecture is one in which disruption at a critical node does not automatically become disruption of the essential function that node supports.

SECTION 01

Infrastructure as a System

Infrastructure is often organized administratively by sector, but essential functions do not operate that way. Electricity, telecommunications, transportation, water, industrial production, food distribution, medical supply and public safety are operationally coupled. A system can therefore appear healthy when measured asset-by-asset while remaining fragile at the points where sectors intersect.

SRA 01 established the cross-sector character of communications infrastructure: communications support energy, transportation, water, emergency services, information technology and financial services, while communications themselves depend on energy, information technology and transportation.^[6] SRA 05 similarly identifies electricity as a strategic operating layer for industry, telecommunications, data centers, transportation, health, water, agriculture and defense-supporting activity.^[7]

SYSTEM LAYER	EXAMPLES	SYSTEM-LEVEL QUESTION
Physical	Power plants, grids, ports, roads, rail, pipelines, facilities	Can the physical pathway continue or be restored?
Digital	Telecom, cloud, control systems, data, software	Can information and operational control continue?
Industrial	Factories, machine tools, components, repair capacity	Can critical goods be produced, repaired or replaced?
Logistics	Ports, corridors, warehouses, customs, inland transport	Can critical flows be rerouted?
Resource	Energy, minerals, water, agricultural inputs	Are critical inputs available and substitutable?
Institutional	Authorities, contracts, regulation, emergency procedures	Can decisions be made and implemented quickly?

HRS does not assume that integration is always beneficial. Tighter coupling can improve efficiency while increasing the speed with which failures propagate. The objective is therefore not maximum interconnection; it is controlled interconnection with sufficient alternatives.

SECTION 02

From Sector Readiness to System Readiness

The nine preceding assessments form an evidence base rather than nine isolated publications. Each contributes a specific capability to the system-level picture.

SRA	PRIMARY CONTRIBUTION	SYSTEM RELEVANCE
01	Connectivity, digital dependency, cyber/operational continuity	Information and coordination layer
02	Compute, cloud, power, cooling, hardware and workload continuity	Digital processing layer
03	Resources, processing, refining, reserves and substitutability	Material input layer
04	Mine-to-magnet chain and processing concentration	Specialized industrial input layer
05	Generation, transmission, storage, fuel and restoration	Core operating-energy layer
06	Gateways, corridors, chokepoints, operational technology and recovery	Physical flow layer
07	Inputs, production, processing, storage and distribution	Essential-goods layer
08	Active ingredients, manufacturing, cold chain, equipment and reserves	Health-security layer
09	Production depth, tooling, workforce and transferability	Production and repair layer
10	Interdependency, cascading failure and alternative pathways	System-readiness layer

SRA 09 explicitly connects materials, energy, logistics, technology and workforce to industrial capacity and recommends considering the assessments together when evaluating hemispheric resilience.^[8] SRA 08 similarly links medical continuity to energy, ports, logistics and food systems

SRA 10 does not replace the earlier assessments. It provides the analytical layer in which their findings can be tested against common scenarios, shared dependencies and competing recovery requirements.

SECTION 03

The HRS System Resilience Architecture

HRS defines the Western Hemisphere Resilience Architecture as an analytical model, not a political organization, treaty, common authority or ownership structure. It describes the functional relationships among critical systems and the conditions under which sovereign states and institutions can preserve essential operations.

HRS FUNCTION	DEFINITION AT SYSTEM LEVEL
Baseline	Map assets, services, dependencies, ownership, corridors and institutional responsibilities.
Exposure	Identify physical, digital, financial, geographic, technological and external-source exposure.
Dependency	Determine which inputs, suppliers, routes, technologies or decisions are non-substitutable.
Continuity	Test whether essential functions can continue under degraded conditions.
Recovery	Measure the time, resources and authorities required to restore lost capability.
Adaptation	Determine whether the system can change before accumulated dependencies become systemic constraints.

SRA 01–09 provide the sector evidence base; SRA 10 evaluates the connections among the nine sectors — digital infrastructure, data and artificial intelligence, materials, rare earths, energy, maritime and logistics, food, medical supply, and manufacturing.

At system level, every stage must consider cross-sector consequences. A decision that improves readiness in one sector while creating a new single point of failure in another is not automatically a resilience improvement.

SECTION 04

Critical Dependencies Across the Nine Sectors

A critical dependency exists when loss of an input, service, route, technology, supplier or institutional function can materially impair an essential capability and replacement is not available within an acceptable period.

DEPENDENCY	PRIMARY SECTORS AFFECTED	TYPICAL PROPAGATION PATH
Electricity	01, 02, 06, 07, 08, 09	Power loss → communications/compute/production/logistics disruption
Telecommunications / data	01, 02, 06, 09	Connectivity loss → control/data/coordination degradation
Critical materials	03, 04, 09, 05	Material shortage → equipment/manufacturing/energy constraints
Ports & corridors	03, 04, 05, 07, 08, 09	Gateway disruption → delayed inputs and finished goods
Industrial equipment	05, 06, 08, 09	Equipment shortage → slower repair/expansion/recovery
Water	05, 07, 08, 09	Water interruption → generation, agriculture, processing, manufacturing impacts
Workforce	01, 02, 05, 06, 08, 09	Skill shortage → maintenance, repair and recovery delays
Finance / contracts	03, 05, 06, 07, 08, 09	Capital/contract disruption → delayed procurement and project execution

The HRS Strategic Dependency Test asks: What fails? What depends on it? How quickly does the effect propagate? Is there an independent substitute? Can the substitute operate at required scale? Who has authority to activate it? How long can the essential function remain degraded?

Multiple assets do not constitute meaningful redundancy if they share the same upstream dependency, technology platform, energy source, corridor or maintenance ecosystem. SRA 06 formalizes this through route, facility, equipment, supplier and decision-authority levels.^[10]

SECTION 05

Strategic Nodes, Corridors and Chokepoints

System resilience is shaped disproportionately by nodes that connect multiple sectors or geographic regions. A strategic node may be a port, power substation, transmission corridor, data center, cable landing station, industrial cluster, refinery, mine-to-processing link, railway junction, water system, warehouse network or specialized repair facility.

NODE TYPE	CONNECTED FUNCTIONS	PRIORITY READINESS TEST
Maritime gateway	Minerals, food, energy equipment, medical goods, manufacturing	Alternative port + inland route + equipment + information pathway
Energy node	Generation, transmission, fuel, industrial load	Alternative generation + transmission + restoration capacity
Digital node	Telecom, cloud, data, government, finance	Independent connectivity + power + compute + recovery
Industrial cluster	Manufacturing, workforce, suppliers, energy, logistics	Production transfer + tooling + workforce + upstream alternatives
Resource corridor	Mine, rail/road, port, processing facility	Processing alternative + transport alternative + stockpile
Medical node	Active ingredients, manufacturing, packaging, cold chain, distribution	Qualified alternate production + reserves + logistics

HRS defines a strategic chokepoint as a location or system component where loss of capacity produces consequences materially larger than the physical size of the asset itself. The objective is not to eliminate all chokepoints. It is to understand their system consequences and ensure that essential functions retain alternatives.

A mineral chain may have multiple mines but one processing pathway. A manufacturing network may have multiple factories but one machine-tool supplier. A digital system may have multiple data centers but depend on the same regional grid or carrier. These are examples of nominal rather than effective redundancy.

SECTION 06

Energy–Digital–Industrial Nexus

Energy is a foundational operating layer because digital infrastructure and industrial production increasingly require continuous, high-quality electricity. The 2026 Department of Energy Office of Electricity strategic plan identifies scaling for new load, reliability, security, resilience and supply-chain security as core grid challenges. The Department of Energy has also highlighted constraints involving transformers, circuit breakers, substations and power electronics.^[11–12]

Reliability work by the North American Electric Reliability Corporation shows that rapidly increasing demand, including demand associated with data centers and the digital economy, is becoming a material reliability-planning issue for the North American bulk power system.^[13]

DEPENDENCY	FAILURE CONSEQUENCE	RESILIENCE RESPONSE
Generation adequacy	Load shedding / curtailed industrial operations	Diverse dependable capacity and demand management
Transmission capacity	Generation unavailable to constrained load	Transmission alternatives and restoration capability
Transformers / grid equipment	Extended repair or expansion delays	Supplier depth, standardization, refurbishment and domestic capacity
Control systems	Operational degradation	Segmentation, secure alternatives, manual procedures
Data centers	Loss of compute and digital services	Geographic diversity, workload portability, power diversity
Industrial workforce	Longer repair / expansion cycles	Training pipelines, cross-skilling and knowledge retention

HRS does not prescribe a universal energy mix. The system-readiness question is whether the chosen architecture can meet essential demand, recover from credible disruption and preserve the ability to adapt as technology and demand change.

SECTION 07

Materials–Manufacturing–Logistics Nexus

SRA 03 and SRA 04 establish that possession of minerals is not equivalent to strategic readiness. Processing, refining, transport, manufacturing, recycling and qualified industrial demand determine whether a resource can become usable capability. SRA 09 extends the chain into production depth, tooling, workforce, equipment and transferability.^[14–15]

This creates a circular dependency. Manufacturing requires materials and logistics; logistics requires energy and equipment; energy infrastructure requires materials and manufacturing; and the industrial base requires logistics to deliver both inputs and finished equipment.

CHAIN	PRIMARY DEPENDENCY	SYSTEM-LEVEL VULNERABILITY
Resource → processing	Power, water, technology, equipment	Extraction without transformation capacity
Processing → manufacturing	Qualified materials, transport, contracts	Single processing pathway
Manufacturing → deployment	Ports, rail, roads, warehousing	Production without delivery capacity
Repair → restoration	Spare parts, machine tools, workforce	Long recovery due to specialized equipment
Recycling → secondary supply	Collection, processing, technology	Loss of potential substitute material

The system-level priority is production optionality. A resilient architecture preserves more than one credible pathway from strategic input to usable capability. Where full duplication is inefficient, inventories, repair capacity, modular design, qualified substitutes and preplanned transfer arrangements can create additional options.

SECTION 08

Food–Medical–Infrastructure Nexus

Food and medical systems are often evaluated as end-use sectors, but both depend on the same underlying infrastructure. Food production and distribution require energy, water, fertilizer, machinery, storage, transportation and digital systems. Pharmaceutical and medical supply chains require energy, water, specialized equipment, packaging, logistics, cold chain, data and skilled labor.^[16–17]

This creates common-mode risks. A major power failure, port closure, fuel shortage, cyber incident or transportation disruption can affect food and medical continuity simultaneously. The system-level response should therefore avoid designing each sector's emergency architecture independently when the sectors share underlying dependencies.

SHARED LAYER	FOOD EXPOSURE	MEDICAL EXPOSURE
Energy	Irrigation, processing, refrigeration, transport	Manufacturing, sterilization, cold chain, facilities
Water	Production, processing	Manufacturing, cleaning, quality systems
Logistics	Inputs, storage, export/import flows	Active ingredients, equipment, finished medicines
Digital	Market coordination, farm operations, logistics	Quality, inventory, traceability, distribution
Manufacturing	Machinery, fertilizer, processing equipment	Active ingredients, devices, packaging, diagnostics
Workforce	Agriculture, logistics, processing	Manufacturing, laboratory, technical services

HRS uses the concept of critical-function continuity: when a shared dependency fails, priority should be given to maintaining essential functions whose interruption creates the greatest secondary consequences. This requires pre-identified alternatives, reserves and decision authority.

SECTION 09

Cascading Failure and Compound Disruption

A cascading failure occurs when disruption in one system activates dependencies in other systems, increasing the scale or duration of the original event. Compound disruption occurs when two or more stresses interact so that recovery is materially harder than under either stress alone.

The HRS system-level framework distinguishes physical propagation (failure of a route or facility), functional propagation (loss of a service required by another system), and decision propagation (institutional overload, conflicting priorities or unclear authority).

SCENARIO	PRIMARY SHOCK	POTENTIAL CASCADE
Grid equipment shortage	Transformer failure / long replacement time	Power restoration delay → telecom, water, industry, health
Port closure + fuel constraint	Gateway unavailable while fuel supply tightens	Rerouting congestion → agriculture, medical, manufacturing
Cyber incident + workforce shortage	Operational technology degraded	Slower diagnosis/recovery → prolonged physical disruption
Mineral processing interruption	Refining unavailable	Manufacturing shortage → equipment repair/energy expansion delays
Major data-center outage	Compute unavailable	Government, finance, logistics and industrial coordination degraded
Logistics disruption + medical shortage	Transport constrained while supply is low	Hospital inventory depletion → emergency procurement pressure

These are stress tests, not predictions. The appropriate output is a readiness finding: which dependency would become decisive, how long the function could operate, and what alternative could be activated?

SECTION 10

Foreign Strategic Participation and Infrastructure Dependency

Foreign investment, ownership, construction, technology or operation is not treated by HRS as inherently harmful. The analytical question is whether a particular form of participation creates a dependency that materially constrains security, continuity, data access, maintenance, substitution or sovereign decision-making.

The 2026 U.S. policy environment has placed greater attention on strategic infrastructure and foreign-source dependencies. A White House action on the bulk-power system in August 2026 directs attention to foreign-produced equipment, associated software and lifecycle mechanisms where risks could affect critical infrastructure.^[4]

The U.S. Southern Command's 2026 posture statement to Congress places Western Hemisphere security, strategic access and infrastructure within a broader defense context.^[18] Independent research from U.S. policy institutions also examines foreign infrastructure participation and U.S. investment across energy, digital infrastructure, manufacturing and services.^[19–20]

VARIABLE	LOWER EXPOSURE	HIGHER EXPOSURE
Control	Multiple independent operators / clear authority	Single operator with strategic control
Technology	Interoperable / replaceable	Proprietary / difficult to replace
Maintenance	Multiple qualified providers	Single external maintenance ecosystem
Data	Transparent access and governance	Opaque or externally controlled critical data
Supply	Multiple independent sources	Common upstream source
Recovery	Domestic/regional repair capability	External repair dependency
Sovereign authority	Clear practical ability to direct/substitute	Limited practical alternatives

HRS does not recommend categorical exclusion of any foreign partner, technology or supplier. It recommends project-by-project strategic dependency analysis with explicit continuity, security, lifecycle and substitution requirements — a determination that remains the exclusive prerogative of the sovereign government concerned.

SECTION 11

Infrastructure Optionality and Effective Redundancy

Infrastructure optionality is the capacity to maintain an essential function through more than one credible pathway. It is distinct from simple duplication. Two facilities can share the same power corridor, network provider, software platform, equipment supplier, port, water source or workforce pool and therefore fail together.

LEVEL	QUESTION	EVIDENCE OF EFFECTIVE REDUNDANCY
Route	Can flows move another way?	Validated alternate corridor with adequate capacity
Facility	Can another site perform the function?	Qualified facility with required inputs and approvals
Equipment	Can the failed component be replaced?	Compatible spare / alternate equipment / repair capability
Supplier	Can another supplier deliver?	Independent qualified supplier with real capacity
Decision authority	Can the alternative be activated?	Predefined authority, contract, procedure and resources

The strongest form of optionality is not necessarily the most expensive. Standardization, spare parts, modularity, interoperability, geographic diversity, emergency contracts or small strategic inventories can create more resilience than full asset duplication.

HRS ECONOMIC QUESTION

What is the least-cost intervention that creates a materially independent alternative to a critical dependency?

SECTION 12

The HRS System Readiness Test

SRA 10 consolidates the sector methodologies into a system-level test. It is a decision framework rather than a numerical score.

STAGE	SYSTEM QUESTION	ILLUSTRATIVE INDICATORS
1. Dependency	What must remain available?	Critical inputs, services, routes, technologies
2. Exposure	Where can it fail?	Geography, concentration, cyber, physical, external-source
3. Interconnection	What else depends on it?	Cross-sector dependency map, cascade pathways
4. Substitutability	What can replace it?	Qualified alternatives, transferability, interoperability
5. Continuity	How long can essential functions operate?	Reserves, degraded operations, alternate capacity
6. Recovery	How quickly can capability return?	Repair time, procurement lead time, workforce, authority
7. Adaptation	Can the system change before vulnerability accumulates?	Technology refresh, infrastructure lifecycle, institutional learning

A system is structurally stronger when critical dependencies are visible, alternative pathways are credible, activation authority is clear, recovery capacity is measurable, and lessons from disruption change future design.

A system is structurally exposed when a critical function depends on concentrated inputs, shared upstream dependencies, long replacement cycles, opaque technology, limited repair capability or unclear decision authority.

The framework is deliberately technology-neutral and administration-neutral. It can be applied in 2030, 2050 or 2126 without assuming which technology, supplier, political administration or energy configuration will dominate.

SECTION 13

Western Hemisphere Strategic Infrastructure Landscape

The Western Hemisphere contains complementary infrastructure and industrial capabilities distributed across different sovereign jurisdictions. HRS does not rank countries. The following roles are analytical descriptions of capabilities relevant to system-level resilience and are not policy assignments.

JURISDICTION / REGION	ANALYTICAL INFRASTRUCTURE ROLE
United States	Advanced industrial, energy, digital, defense, financial and technology depth; principal source of capital, equipment, research and demand.
Canada	Energy, minerals, advanced manufacturing, aerospace, transport, research and Arctic/Atlantic/Pacific connectivity depth.
Mexico	Manufacturing, energy, logistics, automotive/electronics and North American production integration.
Brazil	Large diversified industrial, agricultural, energy, mineral, logistics and digital platform; major Atlantic geography.
Argentina	Agricultural, food-processing, energy, chemicals, automotive, industrial and resource capabilities; South Atlantic position.
Guyana	Rapidly developing energy, transport, agricultural and infrastructure base with growing northern South American Atlantic relevance.
Chile	Mining, energy, Pacific logistics, advanced materials and industrial services; Pacific-facing position.
Peru	Mining, food, industrial services and Pacific logistics; resource-to-port corridors.
Colombia	Energy, food, manufacturing, logistics and Caribbean/Pacific access; geographic connectivity.
Bolivia	Critical mineral and energy-resource potential, especially lithium; inland logistics and processing capacity are key variables.
Paraguay	Agriculture, river logistics, energy and export-oriented industrial activity linked to regional corridors.
Uruguay	Atlantic logistics, ports, food/agricultural systems, energy and services; regional gateway potential.
Central America	Interoceanic logistics, ports, energy, manufacturing/assembly, agriculture and proximity to North American markets.
Caribbean	Maritime gateways, energy terminals, air-sea logistics, food and medical supply nodes, undersea connectivity and strategic geography.

Recent national planning demonstrates that infrastructure priorities are independently developed by sovereign governments. Mexico's 2026–2030 plan covers energy, rail, roads, ports, health, water and airports; Brazil's 2026 national logistics plan establishes a long-range transport reference; Peru's 2026–2031 plan prioritizes high-impact infrastructure; Guyana's 2026 budget places major resources in roads, energy and transport; and Uruguay continues national investment in transport and logistics.^[21–25]

SECTION 14

Implications for the United States

The system-level relevance to the United States is direct. A more resilient Western Hemisphere can increase the number of available pathways for U.S. supply chains, industrial inputs, energy, logistics, emergency response and strategic access. It can also reduce the probability that a disruption at one regional node becomes a broader U.S. economic or security problem.

The 2026 National Defense Strategy identifies the U.S. defense industrial base as foundational to developing, producing, sustaining and transporting military capability. The National Resilience Strategy frames infrastructure reliability, economic resilience, national security and public safety as interconnected resilience domains.^[1,5]

DEPARTMENT / AGENCY	POTENTIAL RELEVANCE
Department of State	Western Hemisphere engagement; sovereign-government coordination; diplomatic and economic tools; strategic access.
Department of Defense / SOUTHCOM	Defense mobility, logistics, force-supporting infrastructure, contingency access and regional security.
Department of Energy	Grid reliability, energy infrastructure, critical materials, energy technology and supply-chain security.
Department of Commerce / NIST	Industrial capacity, manufacturing, standards, technology and supply-chain depth.
U.S. Trade Representative	Trade relationships, market access and supply-chain diversification.
Department of Transportation / MARAD	Ports, maritime infrastructure, logistics corridors and transportation continuity.
Department of Homeland Security / CISA	Critical infrastructure protection, cyber resilience and operational continuity.
Department of Agriculture	Food production, agricultural inputs, logistics and food-system continuity.
HHS / ASPR / FDA / CDC	Medical supply chains, preparedness, manufacturing and continuity of critical health functions.
DFC / EXIM / SBA	Investment, export finance, project preparation and private-sector capacity where authorized.

The HRS proposition is not that U.S. agencies should manage foreign infrastructure. It is that U.S. decision-makers benefit from understanding the infrastructure dependencies that connect U.S. interests to sovereign systems across the hemisphere.

SECTION 15

50–100 Year Infrastructure Horizon

Infrastructure has a time horizon that exceeds electoral cycles, administrations and technology generations. A transmission corridor, port, industrial cluster, fiber route, water system, refinery, mine, railway or data-center campus can shape economic and strategic options for decades.

REFERENCE	STRATEGIC QUESTION	HRS PRIORITY
2030	Can immediate bottlenecks and single points of failure be reduced?	Dependency maps, reserves, repair capacity, alternative routes, project preparation.
2050	Has durable infrastructure depth been built?	Distributed capacity, equipment ecosystems, workforce, diversified corridors.
2075	Can the architecture adapt as technologies and trade patterns change?	Interoperability, technology refresh, flexible facilities, substitute pathways.
2126	Can future institutions preserve strategic choice under unknown conditions?	Adaptable architecture, learning systems, replacement pathways and sovereign decision authority.

THE HRS 100-YEAR PROPOSITION

Not a prediction about 2126. It is a design principle: build systems that can change faster than vulnerabilities accumulate.

Lifecycle thinking is essential. Procurement decisions should consider replacement time, maintenance ecosystems, software and firmware dependencies, workforce availability, standardization, interoperability and exit options. Infrastructure should not be designed around an irreversible dependency when a practical alternative can be preserved.

The appropriate long-horizon question is not "what technology will dominate?" It is "will future decision-makers retain credible choices when today's infrastructure reaches the end of its useful life?" HRS designs its analytical frameworks for a multi-decade institutional application horizon, so that today's assessment remains a usable reference as conditions change.

SECTION 16

HRS Research Priorities and Decision Framework

SRA 10 identifies research priorities that can convert system-level analysis into future country, corridor and project assessments without turning the public research series into a procurement program.

PRIORITY	RESEARCH QUESTION	POSSIBLE HRS OUTPUT
System dependency mapping	Which dependencies connect multiple critical sectors?	System Dependency Register
Strategic node analysis	Which nodes have disproportionate system consequences?	Strategic Node Profiles
Corridor resilience	Which alternative routes are operationally credible?	Corridor Readiness Assessments
Compound stress testing	Which combinations produce unacceptable cascades?	Scenario Stress Tests
Production optionality	Where can critical production be transferred or expanded?	Industrial Optionality Maps
Infrastructure lifecycle	Which long-lived assets create future lock-in?	Lifecycle Dependency Reviews
Foreign participation	Where does participation create material dependency?	Project-Level Dependency Reviews
Investment feasibility	Which interventions create durable capability?	Readiness-to-Investment Assessments
Institutional readiness	Can authorities activate alternatives quickly?	Decision & Activation Reviews

These outputs are intentionally modular. They can support public research, government technical discussions, private-sector feasibility work or country-specific assessments while preserving a clear separation between HRS Foundation research and any future commercial implementation activity by HRS Hemispheric Resilience System, Inc.

SECTION 17

Conclusion

The Western Hemisphere's strategic infrastructure should not be understood as a collection of independent sectors. Electricity, digital connectivity, data infrastructure, materials, manufacturing, ports, logistics, food and medical systems form a network of dependencies. The reliability of one system can determine the availability of another.

The first nine HRS Sector Readiness Assessments establish the sector evidence base. SRA 10 adds the system layer: it asks where dependencies converge, where failures can cascade, where redundancy is only nominal, and where alternative pathways can preserve essential functions.

The 2026 U.S. policy environment reinforces the relevance of this approach. The National Resilience Strategy emphasizes risk-informed resilience; the National Defense Strategy emphasizes industrial capacity; the Department of Energy and the North American Electric Reliability Corporation identify energy-system reliability and supply-chain constraints as strategic issues; and the Southern Command's posture to Congress places renewed attention on Western Hemisphere security and strategic access.^[1,5,11,13,18]

At the same time, the architecture must remain durable beyond any particular administration. HRS therefore anchors its analysis in enduring institutional interests: reliable infrastructure, national security, economic continuity, industrial depth, secure supply chains, freedom of action, recoverability and sovereign choice.

The Western Hemisphere does not require every country to possess every capability. It requires sufficient depth and optionality that a failure in one jurisdiction, corridor, technology or supplier does not automatically become a failure of the essential function. For the United States, this means a hemisphere in which critical economic and security pathways have greater depth, more credible alternatives and stronger recovery capacity. For sovereign governments across the hemisphere, it means greater visibility into their own dependencies and more options when conditions change.

FINAL HRS PROPOSITION

Resilience is not the strength of individual infrastructure sectors. It is the availability of alternative pathways across interconnected critical systems.

That proposition is the bridge between the HRS public research program and the next generation of country, corridor and implementation assessments.

METHODOLOGY, RESEARCH INTEGRITY AND LIMITATIONS

HRS System Readiness Methodology

SRA 10 applies the HRS Readiness Cycle and the HRS Strategic Dependency Test at a system level. The methodology is an original HRS analytical construct developed by synthesizing recurring readiness variables established across SRA 01–09.

Evidence discipline. Documented facts are distinguished from HRS analytical judgments. Public-source evidence is used to establish conditions, policies, infrastructure characteristics and documented dependencies. Where evidence is incomplete, uncertainty is not converted into a categorical finding.

Sovereignty. Sovereignty is a foundational boundary condition. HRS does not score the legitimacy of a government's choices, recommend ownership transfers, or prescribe which foreign partner, technology or supplier a sovereign state should select.

Foreign participation. Nationality alone is not a risk variable. HRS evaluates control, concentration, access, data, technology lifecycle, maintenance, substitutability and recovery implications on a project-by-project basis.

Time horizon. The 50–100 year horizon is a resilience design horizon, not a forecast. Infrastructure and institutional arrangements are evaluated for adaptability across multiple technology and policy cycles.

Limitations. This public assessment is not a classified intelligence estimate, engineering audit, cybersecurity certification, investment recommendation or country-level readiness score. Country roles are analytical descriptions and do not represent commitments by any government.

Originality. The document presents original HRS synthesis and terminology. Source materials are identified by institution and title; no source is reproduced beyond short descriptive references. The analytical architecture, system-readiness test and propositions are HRS constructs.

Dependency before exposure	Identify what the function requires before judging disruption magnitude.
Effective redundancy over nominal redundancy	Test whether alternatives can operate independently.
Critical function over asset count	Measure ability to preserve essential services, not simply facility count.
Recovery as a design variable	Include repair time, workforce, procurement and authority.
Adaptation over permanence	Preserve ability to replace, reroute, redesign and learn.
Sovereign choice as a boundary	Expand options without prescribing sovereign policy.

Terminology note: certain 2026 public commentary uses informal shorthand for aspects of the current U.S. Western Hemisphere posture. HRS does not treat such expressions as formal doctrine or a permanent policy category. This assessment instead relies on durable, documented institutional priorities and policy instruments: national resilience, national security, infrastructure reliability, industrial capacity, strategic access and sovereign choice.

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